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The Deep Veins of the Sons of Gwalia Litigation 
 
Cary Di Lernia* 
 
This paper engages in a doctrinal analysis of historical precedent on aggrieved 
shareholder claims in the UK. It does so in order to expose the basis for the judgment of the 
House of Lords in the foundational case of Houldsworth v City of Glasgow Bank (1880) 5 
App Cas 317, which held in cases involving fraudulent or misleading behaviour inducing 
share purchase that it would be inconsistent with a shareholder’s membership contract to 
‘claim back’ amounts originally committed to the company for the pursuit of its business 
objects and the payment of its liabilities. This analysis will demonstrate that the judgments 
in Houldsworth (which have prevented shareholders ranking on par with unsecured 
creditors up until the determination of the High Court in Sons of Gwalia Ltd (admin apptd) 
v Margaretic (2007) HCA 1) ignored relevant legislation in the form of s 38(7) of the 
Companies Act 1862 UK which was specifically applicable to cases involving aggrieved 
shareholder claims, instead relying on principles drawn from the law of partnerships to 
decide the case. While it is submitted that the High Court was justified in choosing not to 
apply Houldsworth, the rule may still prove good law in certain circumstances. Having 
been the subject of a recent Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee review the 
issue of aggrieved shareholder claims is current as ever, though the veins of the problem 
run rather deep in the history of Australian and UK corporations law. This paper seeks to 
illustrate the value of a deeper understanding of the history of such claims to making 
informed policy decisions going forward. The paper argues that the rule in Houldsworth’s 
case should be abrogated by legislation in order to provide certainty in this technical area 
of the law. 
 
 
On 18 August 2004 Luka Margaretic bought 20,000 shares in Sons of Gwalia (SoG), a gold 
mining company based in Western Australia, on the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX). 
Just over a week and a half later on 29 August, directors of the company appointed 
administrators on the belief that the company was or was likely to become insolvent under s 
436A(1). The company entered into a deed of company arrangement under Div 10 of Pt 
5.3A of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), under which administrators were to distribute 
SoG’s remaining assets in the same order in which it would if it were being wound up.  
It has since emerged that the company’s Chief Financial Officer had been engaging 
in unauthorised gold hedging and foreign exchange trading activities from the mid 1990’s. 
Spectacular losses were made and housed in off-balance sheet accounts to the point that 
‘directors considered that the extent of the potential losses threatened the company’s 
existence’,1 yet no public announcements were made alerting the market to this 
information. Apparently, according to the administrator’s report, SoG did not take an 
opportunity to close out commitments to its options contracts in August 1999 at a cost of 
$74 million. Instead, with a rising gold price and more call than put options over its gold 
reserves, ‘the company’s treasury operations got out of control and the company appeared 
to have been riding a train with no brakes towards a cliff. The cliff took a long time to 
arrive – August 2004, when the company collapsed owing about $1 billion’.2 
In Sons of Gwalia Ltd (admin apptd) v Margaretic,3 the High Court controversially 
chose not to apply a rule said to be germane to aggrieved shareholder claims in cases of 
insolvency involving fraudulent and misleading behaviour known as the rule in 
Houldsworth’s case.4 The rule said to have been developed in Houldsworth v City of 
Glasgow Bank
5
 had up until the High Court’s decision been used to interpret legislative 
provisions concerning shareholder claims, preventing shareholders from ranking on par 
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with unsecured creditors for over a century and resulting in problematic determinations in 
the context of modern developed markets. The case established that in cases involving 
fraudulent or misleading behaviour inducing share purchase it would be inconsistent with a 
shareholder’s membership contract to ‘claim back’ amounts originally committed to the 
company for the pursuit of its business objects and the payment of its liabilities. While it is 
submitted the High Court was justified in choosing not to apply the rule in Houldsworth’s 
case and thus allowing shareholders to claim as unsecured creditors, the rule may still 
prove good law in certain circumstances.6  
This paper engages in a doctrinal analysis of historical precedent on defrauded 
shareholder claims in the UK to demonstrate that the decision in Houldsworth and 
subsequent interpretation and application of the ‘rule’ therein suffer from deep flaws which 
have led to unjust determinations in view of the regulatory matrix surrounding the 
operation of Australian financial markets and the protections afforded to market 
participants. Part one will analyse two cases preceding Houldsworth, Oakes v Turquand7 
and Tennent v City of Glasgow Bank8, which set the scene for Houldsworth’s claim and had 
a direct bearing on the outcome of the case. In part two, an analysis of Houldsworth proper 
will be undertaken. On the basis of this analysis it will be argued that it is necessary to put 
the current uncertainty surrounding the applicability of Houldsworth in Australia beyond 
doubt through legislative abrogation of the rule in Houldsworth’s case. The purpose of this 
paper is to advocate law reform and to demonstrate that an understanding of the history of 
defrauded shareholder claims and how creditors came to be accorded priority ranking in 
such circumstances is essential to making informed decisions about the future direction of 
legislation in this area of the law. 
 
 
Part 1. Houldsworth’s Lineage  
 
Despite its long history and its application in several UK and Australian cases, the High 
Court in Sons of Gwalia chose not to apply authority in the form of Houldsworth v City of 
Glasgow Bank
9 in deciding whether aggrieved shareholders should rank equally with 
unsecured creditors in cases of insolvency involving misleading and deceptive behaviour. 
To appreciate why, it is necessary to understand the approach taken by the House of Lords 
in that case. An accurate understanding of the decision in Houldsworth however 
necessitates an inquiry into its lineage. If Houldsworth was born in 1880,10 then he was 
conceived by two primary decisions, Oakes v Turquand11 and Tennent v City of Glasgow 
Bank.12 
The question concerning shareholder rights on insolvency which the House of Lords 
faced in Oakes’ case was the first of its kind to be decided after the enactment of the 
Companies Act 1862 UK, the progenitor of Australia’s Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). Upon 
the bankruptcy of Overend, Gurney, & Co. Limited, a company providing bill broking and 
money dealing services, two shareholders alleged that they were induced to take shares in 
the company by way of false and fraudulent representations made by the company in a 
prospectus. The shareholders, Oakes, who subscribed for an initial offering of shares in 
Overend directly from the company and Peek, a transferee shareholder who bought his 
shares on the open market, sought to have their names removed from the register of the list 
of contributories on Overend’s books. The Law Lords focused their attention on Oakes’ 
case for if he was not able to succeed in being relieved from liability then Peek could have 
no hope of the same. This appears to have been because causality of the misleading nature 
of the prospectus could be established for a subscribing though not a transferee 
shareholder.13 
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All of the Law Lords recognised the fraudulent and deceptive character of the 
prospectus, which omitted important information that would otherwise have enabled an 
accurate assessment to be made by potential investors of the financial future of the 
company. The Lord Chancellor went so far as to say that if the real circumstances facing 
the company had been disclosed ‘it is not very probable that any company founded upon it 
would have been formed’,14 indicating that the fraud practiced was to so great a degree that 
there was no foundation at all on which to base the company.  
Nevertheless, basing their decisions on similar grounds adverse to Oakes in view of 
the difference between void and voidable contracts, principles of partnership law and the 
exact nature of the changes which the 1862 Act had on the dynamics of creditor satisfaction 
in the event of insolvency, the House of Lords rejected Oakes case. Most importantly, on 
Oakes’ contention that due to the fraudulent conduct of the directors that he never really 
held a share and was therefore never really a member, the Court was in no doubt: Although 
the purchase contract was induced by fraudulent activity, the contract itself would stand 
until Oakes chose to rescind it. The Lord Chancellor quoted Clarke v Dickson in support: ‘a 
contract induced by fraud is not void, but voidable only at the option of the party 
defrauded’.15 Since Overend was insolvent and restitutio in integrum was impossible, 
Oakes was left without the remedy of rescission.  
Great emphasis came to be placed by the Lord Chancellor and Lord Cranworth on 
Lord Campbell’s judgment in Henderson v The Royal British Bank,16 a case decided before 
the changes in the Companies Act 1862 UK took effect: 
  
It would be monstrous to say, he having become a partner and a 
shareholder, and having held himself out to the world as such, and having so 
remained until the concern stopped payment, could by repudiating the shares 
on the ground that he had been defrauded, make himself no longer a 
shareholder, and thus get rid of his liability to the creditors of the Bank, who 
had given credit to it on the faith that he was a shareholder.17 
 
The Lord Chancellor saw the reasoning in Henderson’s case as constituting an authority of 
‘great weight’18 against Oakes and would apply unless the new Companies Act 1862 UK 
changed the relationship between the company and its members.  
The Lord Chancellor and Lord Cranworth agreed that the Act intended to put 
shareholders whose names were on the register in the same position towards creditors  
 
as persons engaged in an ordinary partnership, or persons trading formerly 
under the Acts of 1844. In neither of those cases would it have been an 
answer to a creditor that the person sought to be charged had been induced 
by fraud to become a partner or a shareholder, and I see no reason whatever 
for adopting any other principle here.19 
 
Significantly for the development of the law in this area, Lord Cranworth directly applied 
principles of partnership law to a determination of a case concerning a limited liability 
company. Indeed his Lordship saw no reason to question the judiciary’s view of the 
company form, despite the changes in legislation noted above. 
Lord Colonsay stated that the Appellant’s argument proceeded on an ‘erroneous 
view of the nature of these companies, and of the relative positions of the creditors and the 
members’.20 His Lordship stated that although the ‘efforts of the Legislature were directed 
towards giving these companies a separate persona’ through the 1862 Act, they did not 
confer upon them ‘all the attributes of proper corporations without qualification … The 
companies were said to be incorporated, but they were only incorporated to certain effects – 
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they were quasi-corporations’.21 In his view then, the statutory beast created by the 1862 
Act was in fact still under construction – ‘the course of legislation was to rear up the 
company into a separate persona … but without conferring on it in an unqualified manner 
all the attributes of a perfect corporation’.22  
With the decision in Salomon v Salomon & Co.23 thirty years of judicial 
development away, Lord Colonsay turned to principles relating to the partnership form. His 
Lordship stated that although Oakes may have been induced into the contract for shares by 
fraudulent behaviour, that the relevant question on the statute was whether he had agreed to 
become a shareholder as per s 23. Holding Oakes to have done so, it followed that the 
contract into which he had entered was not void, but only voidable. In turn, this meant that 
the contract was valid until rescinded as the case was one where the rights of third parties – 
that is, creditors – ‘intervene’.24 
Despite the fraud practiced on him, upon insolvency creditors found Oakes with his 
name on the register of members, a liability he would otherwise have been able to escape 
through rescission if Overend was a going concern. Since Oakes was a member as defined 
by s 23 of the 1862 Act in that he had simply agreed to become a one, this apparently 
meant that he was liable to contribute to the debts of the company upon insolvency on a 
shallow reading of the 1862 Act. Shallow, for this decision was made without any inquiry 
into s 38(7), a provision directly applicable to the case which states: 
 
No sum due to any member of a company, in his character of a member, by 
way of dividends, profits, or otherwise, shall be deemed to be a debt of the 
company, payable to such member in a case of competition between himself 
and any other creditor not being a member of the company.25  
 
The relevant question pertaining to this section would seem to be whether the claim was 
made in a member’s character of a member, not simply whether they were a member 
according to s 23. This would presumably necessitate an inquiry into the nature of share 
ownership and membership of companies, as well as an interrogation of the meaning of the 
term ‘otherwise’ in the provision. 
The Law Lords had a view of the company form and insolvency largely determined 
by principles relating to the partnership form, where upon insolvency the only rights 
exercisable by a defrauded partner were against their fellow partners, who were in no way 
able to lessen their own obligation towards creditors. Through Lord Chancellor Chelmsford 
and Lord Cranworth’s affirmation of the reasoning in Henderson’s case, and by express 
comment by Lord Colonsay, the idea of ‘holding out’ to creditors thus became a feature in 
the consideration of claims by members against companies in liquidation. The partnership 
analogy applied to a new breed of business owners in shareholders gave vital support to the 
consideration of the interests of creditors in the reasoning of the court, as shown through 
the endorsement of Henderson’s case. In the absence of the partnership law lens which 
drove the court to apprehend shareholders of the company as partners in it, responsible for 
all debts and liabilities whether incurred legitimately or fraudulently, the prominence given 
to creditor interests in cases of insolvency involving fraudulent activity arguably would not 
survive on its own. 
 
The Question in Tennent 
Oakes wished to have his name removed from the register when winding-up and 
administration was underway. The question in Tennent’s case thirteen years later and just 
prior to Houldsworth was whether a contract for shares could be rescinded up until the time 
of the actual commencement of the winding-up, at a time when shareholders knew the 
company to be insolvent, yet before any creditor had instituted the actual winding-up. 
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Lord Chancellor Earl Cairns, who also led the decision in Houldsworth and with 
whom Lords Hatherley, Selborne and Gordon concurred, affirmed the conclusion reached 
in Oakes that a shareholder could not rescind the purchase contract upon insolvency, 
irrespective of any fraud which induced entry into the contract. Accepting that Tennent 
would have succeeded in such an action had the bank been a going concern, Earl Cairns 
nonetheless held that he could not do so upon insolvency. His Lordship based his decision 
on principles relating to void and voidable contracts, and the principle expressed by the 
Lord President in the case at first instance that ‘the option to void the contract is barred 
where innocent third parties have, in reliance on the fraudulent contract, acquired rights 
which would be defeated by its rescission’.26 
In his reasons Earl Cairns looked to the law of partnerships for enlightenment on the 
position of Tennent in the circumstances. As noted above, in ordinary partnerships it was 
not possible for a partner to repudiate the partnership without being bound to satisfy its 
liabilities, whether the partnership was solvent or insolvent. Although fraud may have been 
a reason for relief against his partners, it was held that it was not grounds for escaping 
liabilities owed to external parties in the form of creditors. While the principle differed in 
reality for shareholders in companies who were able to escape liability to creditors via the 
sale of their shares while the company remained a going concern, and at a time when ‘no 
creditor has any specific right to retain the individual liability of any particular 
shareholder’,27 according to the Lord Chancellor,  
 
[t]he repudiation of shares which, while the company was solvent, would not 
or need not have inflicted any injury upon creditors must now of necessity 
inflict serious injury on creditors. I should, therefore, be disposed in any 
case to hesitate before admitting that, after a company has become insolvent 
and stopped payment, whether a winding-up has commenced or not, a 
rescission of a contract to take shares could be permitted as against 
creditors.28 
 
This meant that shareholders would have to be bound in the same way partners were in 
insolvency situations. Earl Cairns was thus of the same mind as Lord Cranworth in Oakes, 
developing the idea of a winding-up simply as a method for the enforcement of payment to 
creditors. For this reason, Earl Cairns was averse to allowing a member to rescind a 
contract for shares after the company had stopped payment, and dismissed the appeal. 
Tennent established that rescission was impossible upon insolvency, that is, before 
formal winding-up procedures had begun. The underlying view of the company and of 
shareholding in Tennent was the same as that expressed in Oakes, although a more forceful 
appeal was made to the interests of creditors in the situation, who by this stage had taken on 
the position of innocent third party purchasers in the law as it stood relating to claims for 
fraudulent transfers of property. 
In analysing these decisions, it is important to appreciate the fact that the House of 
Lords was working on a completely different conceptualisation of the company form to that 
apparent today. Although the House of Lords in Oakes expressly discussed the reasons for 
the development of the Companies Act 1862 UK, the Law Lords nonetheless applied 
principles which appear ill suited to the nature of the corporate form established by that 
piece of legislation. The reason for this was the perception of the company form simply as a 
new incarnation of the partnership, and as noted in Lord Colonsay’s judgment, one which 
was not to be seen as a separate entity of itself as yet.29  
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Part 2. The Inevitable Damages Claim  
and the Development of the Rule in Houldsworth 
 
In February 1877 Arthur Hooton Houldsworth bought 4000 pounds worth of stock from the 
City of Glasgow Bank, an unlimited liability company. In October 1878 the bank went into 
liquidation. As a member Houldsworth’s name was placed on the list of contributories and 
he was called upon to pay 20,000 pounds in calls. A month later in December, Houldsworth 
brought an action for damages against the liquidators on the grounds that he was induced 
by the manager and directors of the bank to purchase the shares in the company by way of 
fraudulent misrepresentations. He sought to recover the value of the purchase price of the 
shares, the amount he had already paid in calls, and a further amount to cover him for 
anticipated estimated future calls. The Court of Session in Scotland found that although 
fraudulent misrepresentations were made,30 that there was nonetheless no success to be had 
against the liquidators for such sums on insolvency. This was based on House of Lords 
precedent in Addie v The Western Bank of Scotland,31 which held that a company could not 
be sued for the actions of its agents, and that defrauded shareholders would have to pursue 
directors personally if they were to recover damages. 
On appeal to the House of Lords, Lord Chancellor Earl Cairns began his judgment 
by confirming that Houldsworth could have rescinded his contract of subscription and 
recovered his expended amounts while the bank was a going concern. Since the winding-up 
of the bank had begun however, by virtue of Oakes and Tennent Houldsworth was unable 
to rescind his subscription contract. The practical effect of this inability to remove himself 
from the list of contributories was that ‘he must remain as liquidation found him, a partner 
in the bank and a contributory as such’.32 Confirming the view he reached in Tennent, 
implicit in Earl Cairns’ reasons was his belief that immediately upon insolvency, company 
assets became the property of creditors, for whom the liquidators act. 
Foreshadowing the issue considered by the High Court in Sons of Gwalia, the 
central question for Earl Cairns was whether a shareholder could retain ownership of 
shares, thus remaining a member of the company, and sue the company at the same time for 
fraudulent inducement. Since the purchase of chattels or goods on fraudulent 
misrepresentation was remediable under the common law, Earl Cairns asked rhetorically 
whether this would also be the case for shares in a partnership or a company? His response 
is seminal, and deserves to be quoted in full: 
 
We are accustomed to use language as to such a sale and purchase as if the 
thing bought or sold were goods or chattels, but this it certainly is not. The 
contract which is made is a contract by which the person called the buyer 
agrees to enter into a partnership already formed and going, taking his share 
of past liabilities, and his chance of future profits or losses. He has not 
bought any chattel or piece of property for himself; he has merged himself in 
a society, to the property of which he has agreed to contribute, and the 
property of which, including his own contributions, he has agreed shall be 
used and applied in a particular way and in no other way. Does, then, the 
principle which in the case of a chattel admits of an action for damages, 
apply to the case of a partnership contract such as I have described?33 
 
The Lord Chancellor’s additional rhetorical in the last line seems to go some way to 
answering his first: He saw the purchase of what moderns would simply call ‘shares’, items 
of personal property, as a ‘partnership contract’. A partnership contract is much more than a 
simple good or chattel, it represents a contractual relationship which consists of rights and 
obligations in respect of the business to which that contract relates.34 In this case the 
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property of the company to which Houldsworth contributed his own funds as a partner 
along with others, was to be used for the business of banking in which the company was 
involved (including the satisfaction of creditor claims on insolvency), not to satisfy the 
claims of members, and this is why principles relating to ordinary property would not 
apply.  
The depth of the nature of share ownership expressed by Earl Cairns was based on 
the statutory contract made between members and their company. Through this statutory 
contract Houldsworth would be entitled to a proportion of the property of the company, 
depending on the proportion of his share ownership. Earl Cairns held that ‘[t]his is the 
contract, and the only contract, made between him and his partners, and it is only through 
this contract, and through the correlative contract of his partners with him, that any liability 
of him or them can be enforced’.35 It was therefore the statutory contract which held the 
abstraction of the company together and was to be upheld at all costs, even against the 
concern of innocent parties fraudulently induced into the fray. Such reasoning effectively 
ignored the fact that the contract for the actual subscription or purchase of shares and any 
fraudulent behaviour involved in their sale comes prior to entry into the statutory contract 
with the company and other members. 
Nevertheless, focussing on the statutory contract Earl Cairns concluded that among 
the debts and liabilities of the company, the allowance of a member’s claim for damages, 
with the effect that the company ‘shall pay the new partner damages for a fraud committed 
on himself by the company, that is, by himself and his co-partners … cannot be intended to 
be included’.36 This would offend the statutory contract which required amounts to be paid 
to the company for use in its business, which in the event of profitable trading would result 
in a return in proportion to the contribution of the member, yet which in the event of a loss 
would result in the member contributing to the debts and liabilities of the company in 
proportion to his contribution, as this was an unlimited liability company.37 
In attempting to reinstate himself to his original position pre-share purchase, Earl 
Cairns saw Houldsworth as bringing his claim as a shareholder and therefore, as 
inconsistent with the statutory contract. This apprehension of the situation entailed a 
disavowal of the possibility that Houldsworth might have been making his claim as an 
average tort victim for phenomena which occurred prior to and during his entry into the 
contract to which he was being held. This could be seen in part to be due to Earl Cairns’ 
failure to give proper regard to the purchase contract. Had he done so, he may have 
perceived that the claim was really brought outside of the simple fact that he was still a 
shareholder when he made the claim, as the fraud complained of was practiced upon him in 
order to induce him into purchase, before he committed his subscription monies in order to 
be entered into the register of members and made a party to the statutory contract.  
Due to this ignorance of the purchase contract and the supreme importance placed 
on the statutory contract holding the new business combination together Earl Cairns saw 
Houldsworth’s actions as inconsistent with the statutory contract he was ensconced in, and 
thus trying to ‘approbate and reprobate’38 at the same time. It appears Earl Cairns and those 
before him had trouble setting these two contradictory notions apart from within the one 
person when the claim related broadly to the member’s shareholding. This was probably 
reinforced by his partnership view of shareholding in the company form, which made it 
difficult to differentiate members from the company they were members of when claims 
were made. The Lord Chancellor concluded by declaring that ‘on principle, irrespective of 
authority, the decision of the Court of Session was right’,39 thus dismissing the appeal. 
Lord Selborne began his judgment by discussing the law of agency and focussing 
on Addie’s case before stating that ‘[t]his is not a case of parties at arm’s length with each 
other … and which may be redressed by damages without any unjust or inconsistent 
consequences’.40 In saying this, his Lordship implicitly chose not to separate out 
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Houldsworth’s two positions in the situation, as a tort victim prior to and at least during 
contract formation, and a member and a victim afterwards. Indeed, he said of 
Houldsworth’s position, that ‘here it is impossible to separate the matter of the pursuer’s 
claim from his status as a corporator, unless that status can be put an end to by rescinding 
the contract which brought him into it’.41  
As did Earl Cairns, Lord Selborne saw Houldsworth’s damages claim for the share 
due from him in contribution to the debts and liabilities of the company as being 
inconsistent with the contract he had entered into: ‘[I]t is of the essence of the contract 
between the shareholders (as long as it remains unrescinded) that they should all contribute 
equally to the payment of all the company’s debts and liabilities’.42 Lord Colonsay’s view 
of the company form in Oakes thus continued to hold sway here as confirmed by Lord 
Selbourne’s comment that ‘such an action of damages is really not against the corporation 
as an aggregate body, but is against all the members of it except one, viz, the pursuer; it is 
to throw upon them the pursuer’s share of the company’s debts and liabilities’,43 thus 
choosing not to separate the existence of the member from the company they constituted for 
the purposes of the claim. From this perspective, Lord Selborne saw rescission as the only 
remedy available to Houldsworth, and ‘the only way in which the company could justly be 
made answerable for a fraud of this kind’.44 Due to the fact the option to rescind had lapsed 
upon insolvency, Lord Selborne also dismissed the appeal. 
Beginning where Lord Selborne concluded, Lord Hatherley stated that since 
restitutio in integrum was not possible, that the contract must remain in force. Accordingly, 
his Lordship also saw the contract as a partnership contract, a partnership from which 
Houldsworth did not discharge himself: ‘It appears to me to be fatal to the Appellant’s right 
to the relief he asks that he is still, or was at the date of the liquidation a shareholder in the 
company against which he asks it’.45 The reason for this was that by becoming a 
shareholder, Houldsworth was entitled to profits made and responsible for losses and 
liabilities incurred in proportion to his shareholding. This meant that if Houldsworth’s 
arguments were correct, according to Lord Hatherley such liabilities may include debts ‘due 
to himself in respect of the damage sustained by him through the wrongful act of the 
company in inducing him by misrepresentation to place himself on the list of 
shareholders’.46 Since Houldsworth was not the only shareholder in this situation, Lord 
Hatherley raised another consideration, that allowing this appeal would lead to an infinite 
regress whereby Houldsworth would have to bear a share of the damages of other 
shareholders who were induced into purchase on the same basis.47 
Lord Hatherley thus chose to see Houldsworth’s claim as being inconsistent with 
the membership contract he entered into, in other words that there was no other relationship 
or link through which he could claim against the company. The Law Lords chose not to 
place much emphasis on the fact that such shareholders did not have much of a choice, 
indeed, going by their conceptualisation of the issue there were really no other conclusions 
open to them in insolvency cases. Lord Hatherley concluded by writing off Houldsworth’s 
claim on the basis of his having had the misfortune of employing a ‘dishonest agent’.48 
Since he missed the opportunity to rescind when restitutio in integrum was possible, 
Houldsworth missed the chance to do away with the liabilities which arose from becoming 
involved with a dishonest agent. Because of what had happened in between the time of his 
purchase of the shares and the insolvency of the company he was unable to rescind in time, 
though if he had his name stricken off the register then he could have stood ‘in the position 
of a stranger with reference to misrepresentations made by agents of the company’.49 As 
such, the very fact of continued membership served to prevent him from bringing a claim in 
relation to his shareholding from any basis other than his status as a shareholder. 
For Lord Blackburn, since the differences in fact between Houldsworth’s claim and 
precedent authority in Addie’s Case were not significant enough to cause a distinction in 
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law, the issue was ruled by that decision. Lord Blackburn stated of the ‘very peculiar’ 
contract to take shares in a company that 
 
the contract equally is in substance an agreement with the company to 
become a partner in the company on the terms that the partner shall, in 
common with all his co-partners for the time being, contribute to make 
good all liabilities of the co-partnership as if this incoming partner had 
been a member of the partnership from the beginning.50 
 
He further stated that although ‘the deceived party may rescind the contract and demand 
restitution, he can only do so on the terms that he himself makes restitution’.51 Being 
impossible for Houldsworth to make restitution, it became impossible to rescind, leading 
Lord Blackburn to reject the appeal. 
 
When a Shareholder is Not Quite a Shareholder 
In view of the authority of the principles established in Oakes and reaffirmed in Tennent, 
since rescission was precluded upon insolvency, Houldsworth sought an untested avenue 
for redress, and decided to sue the company for damages. Because the action was framed in 
this way, the question as to the ability of a member to sue whilst retaining ownership of 
shares became the determinative one, as it appeared to contravene the statutory contract and 
a shareholder’s responsibilities to their fellow shareholders who constituted the abstraction 
of the company.  
Earl Cairns framed the issue by stating that it was impossible to achieve what 
Houldsworth wanted to while the company was a going concern, and therefore should not 
be possible on insolvency either. It is not readily apparent why Earl Cairns was willing to 
treat the company form and shareholder relations to it differently in one instance, that is, 
after insolvency has been established (where it is seen in his reasons the idea that a 
fundamental shift in the weight of interests had occurred in favour of creditors) yet say that 
‘he must also have had a right before the winding-up to have remained a partner and also 
then to have brought an action for damages’.52 Earl Cairns himself stated that the nature of 
the company on insolvency was fundamentally altered; should such an alteration for the 
benefit of a defrauded shareholder also not take place when the shareholder had no 
opportunity to rescind on insolvency? Unfortunately for Houldsworth, the holding out 
doctrine established through prior reliance on Henderson’s case in Oakes forestalled this 
avenue of relief. 
Nevertheless, Earl Cairns found that because shares at that time were considered 
more than simple goods and chattels and represented a partnership contract, that the 
meaning of this contract would preclude a company from paying debts and liabilities due to 
a partner for fraud committed on himself by the company, that is ‘by himself and his co-
partners’.53 Such payments were not seen as legitimate uses of the funds originally 
contributed, which were to be ‘used and applied in a particular way and no other way’.54 
What has come to be known as the ‘inconsistency with contract’ argument is a result of the 
choice to conflate the identity of the company with its members, a reading produced by a 
myopic focus on the statutory contract and principles relating to partnership law. The 
flipside of the refusal to see the claim as being brought outside of a shareholder’s 
membership due to the fact they retained their shares in such cases is the idea that the 
company owed members no duties bar those specified in the statutory contract. This served 
to allocate the risk of fraudulent behaviour to shareholders who chose to invest in the 
company, just as a partner was responsible for wrongs committed by their partners in the 
name of the partnership. 
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Since the fraud would now be recognised as a wrong committed by a separate legal 
entity upon a shareholder by virtue of Salomon, and not by a member upon himself, the 
argument of the inconsistency of making a claim with the statutory contract must fall. An 
important fact which was overlooked in this milieu was that Houldsworth was not a ‘co-
partner’ at the time the original fraudulent activity took place which induced him into the 
subscription contract, but merely a prospective member. As such, the wrong was committed 
against him outside either contract, which chrystallised upon subscription, making him the 
average tort victim of an organisation which was of a different type to the partnership form. 
Lord Selborne made the same conflation Earl Cairns did, stating that because 
Houldsworth and the company were not at arms length from each other, that damages could 
not effect an equitable remedy without unjust or inconsistent results. His failure to separate 
out Houldsworth’s position as a tort victim from his status as a shareholder, seeing his 
relationship to the company only through the statutory contract, meant that he saw an award 
for Houldsworth as inconsistent with the contract entered into with other shareholders to 
contribute equally to payment of all debts and liabilities of the company. The basis for such 
a holding on principles of partnership law is unmistakeable. Because rescission was the 
only remedy available, and since this was impossible due to the lapse of the opportunity to 
rescind now the company was insolvent and restitutio in integrum was impossible, the 
contract remained in force.  
While Lord Hatherley also agreed with this idea, he was nonetheless more forthright 
in his characterisation of the contract as a partnership55 from which Houldsworth did not 
discharge himself. The other basis for Lord Hatherley’s decision was the vicious circle 
argument, which could only really be seen to apply to unlimited companies, where 
shareholders would have to continuously contribute to the debts of the organisation in 
proportion to their shareholding. This was in contrast to limited liability shares which set a 
limit to the amount which was to be contributed by shareholders to the initial subscription 
or purchase price. Justifying his position with reference to personal responsibility for 
decisions in risky markets by reference to the ‘misfortune’ of having employed a dishonest 
agent, Lord Hatherley concluded by drawing attention to authority which suggested that 
rescission would mean Houldsworth could be treated as a stranger to the company. This 
confirms the observation made earlier, that it was only due to the perception of members as 
the company that any issue arising around that relationship was governed by the statutory 
contract, preventing Houldsworth from being seen in any other capacity. With the 
recognition of the corporate veil and separate legal existence of the corporation in Salomon, 
this rationale and all it supports must fall.  
Despite its having been said that ‘the four individual speeches of their Lordships, 
unanimously dismissing the appeal, lack an altogether common thread’,56 the analysis 
above has shown that there is at least one significant thread holding this judgment together: 
The choice to focus on the statutory contract, the resulting inconsistency of a member’s 
claim against that contract, and therefore the perception of the company as not owing any 
duty to shareholders for claims related to their shareholding. This appears to have been 
based on the House of Lords’ view of shareholders as the company, which arose from its 
apprehension of the case through a partnership law lens. Because the claim related to his 
shareholding, by virtue of the very fact that Houldsworth was still in possession of his 
shares, no duty would be owed to him by the company. Although directors would 
personally owe shareholders like Houldsworth a duty and could be pursued as individuals, 
the assets of the company itself could not.  
The apprehension of the corporate form through the prism of partnership law would 
have thrown Houldsworth’s claim into an altogether familiar light at the time, that of a 
partner on a quest to absolve himself from responsibility of the actions of the partnership 
and his co-partners. The Law Lords in Houldsworth demonstrably had the same view of the 
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corporation as Lord Colonsay and the House of Lords in Oakes, in that it was not to be seen 
as a proper corporation, rather as a quasi corporation and thus as not having fully shed its 
partnership skin. As a partner, Houldsworth could not be absolved from his debts under the 
statutory contract regulating his relationship with his fellow members, which specified they 
would pay debts and liabilities as and when due. Despite the dubious foundation of this 
thread in partnership law principles, the thread and its result, the retention of remaining 
capital for creditors, have become the primary reasons why shareholders have not been able 
to claim damages from a company fraudulently inducing share purchase for nearly one and 
a half centuries. While several difficulties have arisen in the interpretation and application 
of Houldsworth, the fact it was based on what is now a completely anachronistic perception 
of the company form and shareholder relations to it alone is cause for serious concern. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Let us for a moment relieve our minds from the trammels imposed by a 
technical use of words and look to the substance and reality of the thing. 
Lord Colonsay, Oakes v Turquand 57 
 
The judgments in Re Addlestone Linoleum Company (1887)58 had the effect of 
consolidating the abovementioned developments in the common law relating to shareholder 
claims on insolvency in the consideration of statute. Through the application of the 
rationales in Houldsworth and prior cases to relevant legislation apparent in this case the 
reasoning in Houldsworth has come to influence the interpretation of relevant legislative 
provisions to the present day. While Gleeson CJ stated that it was not fruitful in the context 
of a determination in Sons of Gwalia to consider the extent to which the perception of 
inconsistency of shareholders claiming back monies from a company in insolvency in older 
cases was affected by partnership or capital maintenance principles, it is an important issue 
to consider in deciding the future direction of legislation.59  
This paper has shown that the historical development of the law in this area was 
tainted from the beginning by principles taken from partnership law and applied to the 
developing company form. Indeed Gummow J stated in the same case that earlier decisions 
demonstrated ‘not so much an analysis and construction of the statutory provision as an 
assimilation of the statutory provision with the prior learning applicable to the law of 
partnership’. As such, ‘doubt must be entertained as to the appropriateness of perpetuating 
this construction with respect to modern statutes’,60 and, it must be added, in view of the 
changes in the nature of modern corporations and share ownership in them.  
In the time since these decisions were handed down the business world has been 
witness to the accelerated development of the company form. Investor interaction with the 
corporate form has changed significantly, with share ownership now being exponentially 
more diffuse than it was in 19th century England. In view of the awkward influence of 
relatively ancient principles on modern decisions dealing with share ownership and 
corporate existence which have resulted in unjust outcomes for aggrieved shareholders, it 
appears necessary that the status of shareholders on the insolvency of companies in cases 
involving fraudulent or misleading behaviour be set clearly, one way or the other.61  
Justice Austin has noted that ‘the effect of the Sons of Gwalia case is to compound 
the technicality of what was already an extremely technical and unsatisfactory part of the 
law’.62 This is especially since Houldsworth may still be found applicable in certain cases, 
such as when a claim is made by a subscribing shareholder when statutory liquidation 
provisions do not apply.63 The rule in Houldsworth’s case as it has come to be articulated in 
subsequent cases has been shown to be based on what is now an anachronistic apprehension 
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of the company form and shareholder relations to it. It is submitted therefore that the rule in 
Houldsworth’s case should be abrogated by statute to prevent it impacting in any further 
way upon the interpretation and application of modern corporations legislation. 
 
Postscript 
In its recent report, Claims by Shareholders Against Insolvent Companies: Implications of 
the Sons of Gwalia Decision released 30 January 2009, the Corporations and Markets 
Advisory Committee (CAMAC) agreed with the approach taken by the High Court in Sons 
of Gwalia, and recommended the abrogation of the rule in Houldsworth’s Case. 
Along with the need for certainty for market participants, the consideration of the 
‘significant shift in Australian corporations legislation’64 and especially the continuous 
disclosure requirements formed the central planks of the CAMACs position, noting also the 
practical benefits of this position: 
 
[A]nother aim of the continuous disclosure, and other corporate disclosure, 
requirements is to promote a properly informed market, thereby enhancing 
the integrity and reputation of that market and encouraging investment. All 
things being equal, prospective shareholders will be more likely to invest in 
the share market if they feel confident that they will have a meaningful 
remedy, should the companies in which they invest fail to make adequate 
disclosure. Promoting investor confidence in the equity market may generate 
greater liquidity in that market and offset, in whole or part, increased costs 
for companies in the smaller debt market.65 
 
Cary Di Lernia, Discipline of Business Law, Faculty of Economics and Business, The 
University of Sydney, Australia. <c.dilernia@econ.usyd.edu.au> 
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